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Abstract: We study the structure of international aid coordination by creating 
and analyzing a tripartite network of donor organizations, recipient countries 
and development issues using web-based information. We develop a measure of 
coordination and find that it is moderate, achieving about 60% of its theoreti-
cal maximum. Many countries are strongly connected to organizations that are 
related to the issues that are salient there. Nevertheless, we identify many coun-
tries that are poorly served, issues that are inadequately attended to, and organi-
zations that focus on the wrong combination of places and issues. Our approach 
may be used to improve decentralized coordination.
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1  Introduction
This paper explores the structure of international development assistance by cre-
ating a tri-partite network composed of aid organizations, countries of interest 
and development issues. The network was constructed using online data on the 
co-occurrence of pairs of organizations, countries and issues in the websites of 
development agencies and in the World Wide Web. We compare the structure of 
networks connecting countries to issues, countries to organizations and organ-
izations to issues, to assess the degree to which the system is able to match a 
country with organizations that have expertise in the issues that are salient in 
that country. More generally, this paper extends the use of data-mining tools and 
network science to the study of decentralized networks of organizations, which is 
an area that hitherto eluded empirical analysis.
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International development assistance became an explicit policy issue in the 
1940s. It arose from two fundamental changes to the global economy: the Great 
Divergence (Pritchett 1997) and the proliferation of states. Over the past two cen-
turies, incomes across countries and regions of the world have greatly diverged, 
from a ratio of about 4 to 1 in 1820 to a ratio of over 100 to 1 at present (Maddisson 
2008). Initially, these rising gaps occurred under colonialism. Income gaps grew 
within large multi-ethnic empires, such as that of the British or the French. It 
was then that Rudyard Kipling (1899) wrote about the White Man’s Burden, based 
on the idea that it was the responsibility of Western empires to raise the level of 
development of their poorer possessions. In France, the organizing principle was 
“Le Rayonnement de la France,” the illumination of the Asian, African and Carib-
bean possessions of the French Empire from its culturally-sunny and ethnically 
French core.
After World War II, however, the decolonization process led to the dismem-
berment of the British and French empires and a concomitantly rapid increase 
in the number of new sovereign states. The large and widening income gaps 
now occurred between, rather than within, sovereign nations. The term “inter-
national” in “international development,” therefore, highlighted the fact that it 
was no longer about sovereigns managing their possessions, but about rich ones 
trying to help poorer ones catch up.
One part of the international development effort was organized multilaterally 
through either the United Nations or the Bretton Woods organizations (i.e., the 
IBRD, a.k.a. the World Bank, the IMF and the GATT1). Simultaneously, rich coun-
tries developed their own international development efforts, which lead to bilat-
eral organizations such as USAID (for the US), DFID (UK), CIDA (Canada), SIDA 
(Sweden), where the acronym ID stands for International Development and the 
letter A for Agency. Other nations preferred to use the term “cooperation” instead 
of “development” for their bilateral efforts. These include the Japanese, Koreans, 
Spaniards and the Dutch.
In addition to official multilateral and bilateral organizations, private phil-
anthropic organizations had emerged from Church groups (e.g., CARE), wealthy 
individuals (e.g., Rockefeller, Ford, Gates), action-oriented groups (e.g., Medecins 
Sans Frontier, ACCION International) and name-and-shame organizations (e.g., 
Human Rights Watch). Moreover, starting around 1960, in different continents, 
regional multilateral development banks were formed, modeled on the World 
Bank. This was the case of the AfDB, ADB and IADB, and more recently the EBRD. 
As a consequence, during the last 60 years the number of organizational actors in 
1 For simplicity, we name organizations through their well-known acronyms. A list of acronyms 
and the organizational names is included in Table 1.
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international development has greatly expanded, giving rise to a very diverse set 
of organizations that now need to coordinate their efforts.
The expansion, however, has not been limited only to the number of actors, 
but has also included the content of the issues at hand. Initially, the intellec-
tual interpretation of the obstacles to development focused on the availability 
of capital and infrastructure. The successful experience of the Marshall Plan in 
Europe (1948–1952) suggested that this was an appropriate approach. The applica-
tion of the same strategy through the IBRD in other parts of the world, however, 
led to disappointment, and the revised strategies identified a widening list of 
potential obstacles to development, including issues such as education, public 
health, demographic pressures, industrial bottlenecks, macroeconomic stability, 
appropriate market regulation, environmental sustainability, human rights, insti-
tutional quality, governance, inequality and gender gaps, among many others. As 
a consequence, different specialized topics were recognized as important and were 
buttressed by dedicated organizations and programs. The UN system responded 
by creating specialized bodies for different purposes such as the WHO (for health), 
UNESCO (education), UNIDO (industrial development), FAO (for agriculture and 
food security), UNDP (technical assistance for development), UNCTAD (trade), 
ILO (labor), UNHCR (human rights and refugees), etc. Concomitantly, the regional 
organizations created similar structures (e.g., the Organization of American States, 
the Pan-American Health Organization, ASEAN, Organization for African Unity).
Within the developed countries, governments started to involve an increasing 
number of ministries and departments, beyond their development agencies, in 
international cooperation efforts, in order to make available their areas of exper-
tise, such as financial regulation, tax administration and health. For example, in 
the USA, some 14 different departments run development assistance programs. 
Within developing countries, a tendency towards decentralization of adminis-
tration and authority led to more independent state and local governments with 
responsibility for many of the development projects.
Hence, economic divergence, decolonization, decentralization and the 
changing conceptual framework resulted in an increasing number of donors, 
recipients and issues, making international development a truly complex under-
taking. The world now has hundreds of official aid organizations and thousands 
of private organizations working in over 140 sovereign states and many more sub-
national governments. According to the Directory of Development Organization 
there are more than 72,000 related organizations around the world.2 The multi-
plication of donors, recipients and issues implies a network with hundreds of 
millions of possible connections.
2 http://www.devdir.org/stats.htm, May 30th, 2012.
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With the emergence of this increasingly complex structure, questions of coor-
dination rose to the fore. How could donor organizations know which recipient 
organizations to work with and on what issues? How could donor organizations 
be sure that they were creating value rather than just duplicating the efforts of 
others? How could organizations be accountable for results if so many other 
players were involved in the process? How should resources be allocated across 
countries and topics? How could resources be allocated to the most effective 
organizations within each topic? How could political parties in donor countries 
support the use of public resources for international development if the benefi-
ciaries could not be held accountable for results?
Given these challenges, the issue of aid coordination has become central to 
the whole development effort. One such coordinating tool is the convening of 
so-called consultative groups or roundtables. A Google search of the term “con-
sultative group,” for instance, finds some 3.4 million pages. The conjunction of 
the terms “roundtable” + “aid” + “development” generates more than 10 million 
pages, while the term “aid coordination” generates more than 420,000 pages.
The purpose of this paper is to map the network of international aid efforts, 
quantify its structure and assess its performance. To do this, we use techniques 
that exploit the footprints left by the aid efforts on the web. We find that the 
aid community is held together by large, diversified organizations, which act 
as hubs that connect to smaller more specialized entities. This defines a more 
horizontal structure with large hubs where the distance between organizations is 
smaller than in a hierarchy. Also, aid organizations tend to organize their efforts 
geographically, except when dealing with the very large developing countries. 
Finally, aid organizations tend to care about the issues that are important for the 
countries they care about, although important misalignments are present, as we 
illustrate below.
2  Centralized vs. Decentralized Coordination
Centralized coordination requires hierarchies. Decentralized coordination lead 
to networks that are more horizontal. Decentralized coordination is not a new 
problem in economics. A founding idea of economics is the invisible hand: the 
notion of a decentralized process where agents following their own goals lead 
to systemic self-organization. Much of economics is focused on the study of the 
potential inefficiencies of self-organizing market coordination (e.g., missing 
markets, non-convexities, imperfect information, externalities, etc.) and of the 
policies that may facilitate improved outcomes. The discussion of economic 
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  coordination reappeared after the Bolshevik Revolution, with questions regard-
ing the viability of central planning. In the view of von Misses and Hayek (Hayek 
1929, 1945), the issue hinged on an information problem. Markets can be seen 
as computing devices that can assess whether a particular good has a social 
value worth more than its inputs, and hence, worthwhile to be produced. In this 
view, markets mobilize information regarding relative preferences, subjective 
  valuations and alternative production techniques that is decentralized among 
potentially many producers and consumers. By contrast, a central planner has 
no alternative process to gather and process this information and hence cannot 
do a decent coordination job. While some formal models were developed to prove 
the potential efficiency of central planning, with a fixed set of goods and tech-
nologies (e.g., Lange 1949; Kornai and Liptak 1965), the literature died out after 
it became clear that the central planner could hardly explore a set of expanding 
technological possibilities in the way that Schumpeterian entrepreneurs could. 
This became patently obvious in the comparison of product diversity and tech-
nological progress between the East and West during the Cold War (Kornai 1992).
Aid coordination faces a similar dilemma to that of markets: the choice 
between centralized control vs. self-organization. The coordination problem con-
sists in the fact that there are many potential sources of supply and demand for 
a large set of alternative development goods. Aid organizations have goals that 
may or may not be altruistic, recipient agencies may be advancing national or 
particular interests and the transaction may involve a grant, a loan or technical 
assistance. The details of the transaction are less important than the fact that, 
whatever are the goals of each organization, only certain types of transactions 
will take place that are agreeable to both parties and their “authorizing environ-
ments” (Moore 1997). One can imagine a situation in which some central entity, at 
the global or national level, controls the process and allocates roles and tasks. For 
example, the current de jure approach to aid coordination, as framed by the Paris 
Declaration for Aid Effectiveness (2005) and the Accra Agenda for Action (2008) 
starts with an international agreement on the substantive targets to be achieved, 
namely, the millennium development goals (MDGs). Given these objectives, 
countries must then write a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, which is supposed 
to serve as a mechanism for donor coordination. This paper should be reviewed 
by the different domestic constituencies and be consistent with the achievement 
of the agreed MDGs. Once the paper is ready, roundtables and consultative groups 
are convened to allocate roles and functions to the different development part-
ners.
In parallel to these formalized de jure processes there are the de facto 
efforts of each donor and each recipient to explore areas of common inter-
est and commit to individual projects without reference to some over-arching 
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planning process. This is particularly so, given that recipient countries are 
composed of many individual and institutional players, each with their own 
agenda. This self-organizing process is based on the fact that each donor, 
recipient or service provider has significant autonomy and hence would only 
enter into voluntary agreements based on identified mutual goals, whatever 
these goals might be.
What the market has taught us is that self-organizing systems require infor-
mation and feedback loops. In the market, the price system is the key source of 
information that allows decentralized coordination, as profit-motivated suppliers 
and utility-motivated consumers respond in opposite ways to price movements. In 
the case of international development, however, it is not clear what the informa-
tion structure is and what brings potential supply and demand to some balance. 
The lack of an appropriate information structure may lead many participants to 
demand more explicit coordination.
One of the major differences between centralized vs. decentralized coordi-
nation is that the former requires a pre-definition of the preferences, while in 
the latter preferences are revealed through the self-organizing process itself. For 
example, the MDGs are an example of the centralized approach that sets targets 
ex ante on some development goals but not others. There are MDGs for educa-
tion and health, but none for better jobs for the non-poor, crime reduction or 
urban transport, although these issues figure prominently in the preferences of 
voters in many developing countries. A self-organizing system would let goals 
be determined by the preferences of donors and recipients, according to their 
own priorities and views, and the process would reveal the matches that pass 
muster with both parties. Just as in a market, however, the system would lack 
the clarity of a well-written and coherent plan.
Another difference between centralized and decentralized systems resides 
in the structure of the networks that they form. Centralized systems tend to be 
characterized by tree-like hierarchies, while decentralized systems tend to self-
organize into more distributed network topologies where cycles and shortcuts 
between nodes in different “branches” are also prevalent and where large hubs 
reduce the distance between any two nodes in the system.
The purpose of this paper is threefold. First, we describe some of the features 
and outcomes of the emergent structure of the aid network. Second, we study, in a 
very indirect and imperfect way, the degree to which the system has been able to 
arbitrage “supply” and “demand” for international development assistance. Third, 
we provide a relative ranking of the degree to which aid organizations, recipient 
countries and development issues are effectively coordinated. Finally, the paper 
also pretends to be a “proof of concept” regarding the potential use of the infor-
mation available through the World Wide Web to analyze complex, non-market 
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activities more generally. Additionally, we have created the Aid Explorer, a web 
application providing information that we believe may help donors and recipi ents 
coordinate their efforts in a more decentralized and self-organizing manner.3
We do this by constructing a network that connects donor organizations, 
recipient countries and development issues. We analyze the degree to which this 
network allows countries to connect to organizations that share similar concerns, 
a property for which we develop a measure called Organizational Consistency. 
Finally, we use this to measure the degree to which organizations, countries and 
issues are adequately coordinated.
The study suffers from the limitations of its data source. We use the co-appear-
ance of terms in the World Wide Web, which has been used to mine interesting 
associations in a number of applications, including gene and protein interactions 
(Cohen et al. 2005), social networks (Lee et al. 2010) and Mexican drug cartels 
(Coscia and Rios 2012). Words are notoriously flexible in their use, a fact that 
introduces noise to our data. They can also refer to negative rather than positive 
associations, as when an organization blames another for some bad outcome. In 
addition, our data does not have time resolution, meaning that we measure the 
connections in the data that is currently available on the web, independently of 
when the documents were written or published. Finally, we capture the inten-
sity of speech, not the amount of money changing hands or the effectiveness of 
the projects undertaken. This implies that we cannot address issues regarding 
the duplication of efforts or the adequacy of the financial allocations. Also, the 
number of results for each query is approximate, because of optimizations made 
by search engines (Büttcher et al. 2010). Nevertheless, the results show that the 
method provides a good view of a system for which alternative empirical method-
ologies are not presently available.
3  Methodology
To analyze the state of aid coordination we study the tripartite network that con-
nects aid organizations to each other and to recipient countries and develop-
ment issues. Figure 1 depicts a representation of our methodology. We start from 
three distinct sets: the set of international aid organizations, the set of recipi-
ent countries and the set of development issues. For the set of organizations we 
include all the organizations that form part of the United Nations system, such 
as FAO or WHO; all the multilateral organizations including the Bretton Woods 
3 http://www.atlas.cid.harvard.edu/aidxp
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  organizations (e.g., The World Bank, the IMF, the IFC, etc.) and the regional 
development banks; all the bilateral organizations (i.e., development aid organi-
zations created by single countries, such as the Belgian Technical Cooperation 
Agency or the Italian Development Cooperation Program). We also include a 
fairly comprehensive list of private foundations, such as the Bill and Melinda 
Gates Foundations or the Soros Foundation, but exclude those that do not have 
an adequate web presence, defined by a threshold on the number of pages in 
their website (of more than 400 pages). The final list includes 153 organizations 
and is presented in Table 1.
Figure 1 A Representation of our workflow. Given a set of real world entities, we classify them 
into “Organizations,” “Countries” and “Issues.” We then make couples of elements from differ-
ent classes and we feed the online search engine with these queries. The results are bipartite 
networks connecting each country with organization and issues, each organization with coun-
tries and issue and each issue with countries and organizations.
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Table 1 The List of the Organizations Included in Our Work with their Corresponding Acronym 
when Present.
Institution Acronym
Abu Dhabi Fund for Development ADFD
Accion International ACCION
Action Against Hunger
Acumen Fund
Adventist Development and Relief Agency ADRA
African Capacity Building Foundation ACBF-PACT
African Development Bank AFDB
Aga Khan Development Network AKDN
Agence d’Aide a la Cooperation Technique Et au Developpement ACTED
Agencia Brasileira de Cooperacao ABC
American Friends Service Committee AFSC
American Jewish World Service AJWS
American Red Cross
American Refugee Committee ARC
AmeriCares Disaster Relief and Humanitarian Aid Organization AMERICARES
Amnesty International
Andean Development Corporation CAF
Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa BADEA
Arab Fund for Economic & Social Development
Ashoka
Asian Development Bank ADB
Atlantic Philanthropies
Australian Agency for International Development AUSAID
Austrian Development Agency AWSG
Austria Wirtschaftsservice Gesellschaft
Belgian Policy Plan for Development Cooperation
Belgian Technical Cooperation
Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation
Canadian International Development Agency ACDI-CIDA
Caribbean Development Bank CARIBANK
Carlos Slim Foundation
Case Foundation
Catholic Overseas Development Agency
Childreach
China Development Bank CDB
China Development Industrial Bank
Christian Aid
Christian Reformed World Relief Committee CRWRC
Church World Service
Concern Worldwide
Congo Basin Forest Fund CBF-FUND
Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere
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Institution Acronym
Danish International Development Agency
Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Internationale Zusammenarbeit GIZ
Development Alternatives Inc. DAI
Direct Relief International
Doctors Without Borders
Dubai Cares
Eurasia Foundation
EuropeAid Development and Cooperation
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development EBRD
European Investment Bank EIB
Fast Track Initiative Catalytic Fund
Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development BMZ
Finnish Department for International Development Co-operation
Food and Agriculture Organization FAO
Food For The Hungry FH
Ford Foundation
French Development Agency
German Development Bank KFW.DE
Global Alliance for Vaccines & Immunization
Global Environment Facility
Global Fund to Fight Aids, Tuberculosis and Malaria
Google Org
Grameen Bank
Grameen Foundation
Hellenic Aid
Helvetas
Hewlett Foundation
High Commissioner of Human Rights OHCHR
Human Rights Council
Human Rights Watch HRW
IBM International Foundation
Instituto Portugues de Apoio ao Desenvolvimento IPAD
Inter-American Development Bank IADB
Inter-American Foundation IAF
International Committee of the Red Cross ICRC
International Cooperation and Development Fund ICDF
International Development Research Centre IDRC
International Fund for Agricultural Development IFAD
International Monetary Fund IMF
Irish Aid
Islamic Development Bank ISDB
Islamic Relief Worldwide
Israel’s Agency for International Development Cooperation
(Table 1 Continued)
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Institution Acronym
Italian Development Cooperation Programme
Japan Bank for International Cooperation JBIC
Japan International Cooperation Agency JICA
Japan Official Development Assistance JODA
Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS UNAIDS
Kauffman foundation
Korea International Cooperation Agency KOICA
Lemelson Foundation
Liechtensteinische Entwicklungsdienst
Life for Relief and Development
Lutheran World Relief LWR
Lux-Development
MacArthur Foundation
Maktoum Foundation
Medair
Medical Assistance Program International MAP
Mercy Corps International
Millennium Challenge Corporation MCC
Mo Ibrahim Foundation
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
Netherlands Ministry of Development Cooperation
New Zealand Agency for International Development
Nordic Development Fund NDF
North American Development Bank NADBANK
Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation NORAD
Novartis Foundation
OPEC Fund for International Development OFID
Oxfam International
Poland Development Co-operation Department
Refugees International
Rockefeller Brothers Fund RBF
Rockefeller Foundation
Romania Official Development Assistance AOD
Salvation Army International Headquarters
Save the Children
Schwab Foundation
Seven fund
Shell Foundation
Skoll Foundation
Slovak Aid
Soros Foundation
Spanish Agency for International Cooperation AECID
Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency SIDA
(Table 1 Continued)
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Institution Acronym
Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation SDC
Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency TIKA
UK Department for International Development DFID
United Nations Capital Development Fund UNCDF
United Nations Centre for Human Settlements
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development UNCTAD
United Nations Democracy Fund
United Nations Development Fund for Women
United Nations Development Programme UNDP
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization UNESCO
United Nations Environment Programme UNEP
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNHCR
United Nations Office for Project Services UNOPS
United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees UNRWA
United States Agency for International Development USAID
United Way International
US African Development Foundation ADF
Waleed bin Talal Foundation
West African Development Bank BOAD
World Bank WB
World Concern
World Food Programme WFP
World Health Organization WHO
World Relief
World Vision International WVI
(Table 1 Continued)
We construct the set of recipient countries by focusing on those with a popu-
lation above 1 million. We then rank the list of remaining countries by GDP per 
capita at purchasing power parity and choose the poorest 110 countries. The 
richest country included is Argentina and the poorest country excluded is Russia. 
The final list of countries is included in Table 2.
Finally, the issues are defined through a manually curated list of keywords 
related to development. In this context, it is crucial to choose keywords that 
are used only in fairly specific contexts. For example, the term “Health” is 
ambiguous, because it may be used in reference both to medical and finan-
cial systems. Our list of issues is based on two types of keywords: concerns 
and activities. Concerns relate to goals or problems, such as poverty reduction, 
malnutrition or civil war; while activities relate to the kind of processes that 
Brought to you by | Harvard University
Authenticated | michele_coscia@hks.harvard.edu author's copy
Download Date | 3/5/13 3:00 PMThe Structure and Dynamics of International Development Assistance      13
Table 2 The List of Countries Included in Our Work.
Afghanistan Guinea Niger
Albania Guinea-Bissau Nigeria
Algeria Haiti Pakistan
Angola Honduras Panama
Argentina India Papua New Guinea
Armenia Indonesia Paraguay
Azerbaijan Iran Peru
Bangladesh Iraq Philippines
Belarus Ivory Coast Republic of Congo
Benin Jamaica Romania
Bolivia Jordan Rwanda
Bosnia and Herzegovina Kazakhstan Senegal
Botswana Kenya Serbia
Brazil Kosovo Sierra Leone
Bulgaria Kyrgyzstan South Africa
Burkina Faso Lao People Democratic Sri Lanka
Burundi Republic Sudan
Cambodia Latvia Swaziland
Cameroon Lebanon Syria
Central African Republic Lesotho Tajikistan
Chad Liberia Tanzania
Chile Libya Thailand
China Macedonia Timor-Leste
Colombia Madagascar Togo
Costa Rica Malawi Tunisia
Democratic Republic of Congo Malaysia Turkey
Dominican Republic Mali Turkmenistan
Ecuador Mauritania Uganda
Egypt Mauritius Ukraine
El Salvador Mexico Uruguay
Eritrea Moldova Uzbekistan
Ethiopia Mongolia Venezuela
Gabon Morocco Vietnam
Gambia Mozambique Yemen
Georgia Myanmar Zambia
Ghana Namibia Zimbabwe
Guatemala Nepal
Guinea-Bissau Nicaragua
are carried out to achieve development goals, such as the banking system, the 
criminal justice or hospitals. Table 3 presents the list of issues, divided into 
concerns and activities.
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We gather our data through two processes. First, we build a custom search 
engine that indexes only the websites of the 153 aid organizations, using the 
Google Custom Search API.4 In this custom search engine, we are able to 
query either all pages or only those in the websites of the 153 aid organiza-
tions in search for documents that mention simultaneously the “World Bank” 
and “Medecins sans Frontiers,” or the “IMF” and “Poverty Reduction,” or 
the “African Development Bank” and Bangladesh. Acronyms and synonyms 
are handled by the entity recognition system of Google search engine. For 
the links that refer to organizations we searched the websites of the 153 aid 
organizations, but to study the relationship between a country and an issue 
we search the entire World Wide Web, and not only the websites of the aid 
organizations. We do this to better capture the importance of the issue for the 
country, beyond its salience in the aid community. As a measure of intensity 
of speech, we record the number of hits that contain each pair. This allows us 
to approximate the strength of the connection.
Table 3 The issues, divided into activities and concerns, included in our work.
Activities Concerns
Agriculture Poverty reduction
Banking System Economic growth
Manufacturing Rural development
Housing Climate change
Transportation Environmental sustainability
Electricity Job creation
Sanitation Technological development
Primary School Homicides
Hospital Civil war
Tourism Natural disaster
Microenterprise Gender
Small and Medium Enterprise Democracy
Criminal Justice HIV/AIDS
Reconstruction Refugee
Humanitarian Assistance School completion
Infant mortality
Malnutrition
Human rights
Corruption
4 https://developers.google.com/custom-search/
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We search for pairs and not triplets or quadruplets, as this would increase the 
number of queries beyond what is feasible to do with the use of a public API.5 For 
example, the set of quadruplets composed of pairs of organizations that cooperate 
on an issue in a country includes 86,977,440 possible combinations (153×152×110×34), 
which would constitute the number of Internet queries we would need to do to map 
out this space. At one query per second, which is the rate allowed by a non-special 
Google Custom Search Engine license, this translates to nearly 3 years of uninter-
rupted querying. We acknowledge this to be a limitation of our approach, since 
aid coordination usually includes more than two organizations, working in a set of 
countries and a set of issues, making relationships non-dyadic. These non-dyadic 
relationships, however, should still be expressed imperfectly in dyadic data, since 
triplets, quadruplets and other sub-graphs are composed of dyads.
We begin by looking first at uni-partite networks, in which all nodes are of 
the same kind (connecting, for instance, countries to countries or organizations 
to organizations). In particular, we explore three such networks: the organization 
space, the issue space and the country space. In each of these, pairs of nodes 
are connected if both appear in the same documents with unexpectedly high fre-
quency (defined below). Besides uni-partite networks, we also study the set of 
all possible bi-partite networks. A network is bi-partite when its nodes are of two 
different types and the links in the network connect only nodes of different type. 
In our case they are the Organization-Country (possible links are 153×110=16,830), 
Organization-Issue (153×34=5202) and Country-Issue (110×34=3740) networks. 
These three bi-partite networks involve 25,772 observations. By looking at pairs, 
instead of triplets or quadruplets, we keep the data collection process manage-
able. In total, we performed 62,140 different queries.
Figure 2 reports the frequency distribution of hits for each of the queries per-
formed. The figures show the number of queries that delivered a certain number 
of hits, or in network terms, the distribution of hits of each link. Because of the 
heterogeneous (fat-tailed) nature of these distributions, we present them in a 
double logarithmic scale and bin them using a technique known as log-binning. 
All of the empirically observed distributions are not well described by a simple 
analytical distribution, such as a power-law or a log-normal distribution. Never-
theless, they vary over several orders of magnitude, indicating that the distribu-
tions are broad, or fat-tailed.
To identify the most important links, we study their statistical significance. 
To do this we take contrast the frequency with which each link appears in our 
5 A public web API is a tool that allows programs to access web content directly. These are com-
monly used to build dynamic content, but can also be used to retrieve data.
Brought to you by | Harvard University
Authenticated | michele_coscia@hks.harvard.edu author's copy
Download Date | 3/5/13 3:00 PM16      Michele Coscia et al.
200 AB
CD
500
300
200
100
50
30
20
10
5
3
2
1
100
50
30
20
10
5
3
2
500
500
300
200
100
50
30
20
10
5
3
2
1
1000
300
200
100
50
30
20
10
5
3
2
1
1
101 102 103 104
# Results
#
 
Q
u
e
r
i
e
s
#
 
Q
u
e
r
i
e
s
#
 
Q
u
e
r
i
e
s
#
 
Q
u
e
r
i
e
s
105
Ivory Coast Microenterprise
China Housing
AfDB Infant Mortality
WHO Hospitals
IMF World Bank
IADB Rockefeller Foundation
Helvetas Doctors Without Borders
Google Org Criminal Justice
World Bank China
Childreach Gabon
Irish Aid Bangladesh
106 107
101 102 103 104
# Results
105 106 107 101 102 103 104
# Results
105 106 107
108 101 102 103 104
# Results
105 106 107
Dominican Republic
Homicides
Figure 2 The distributions of our results for the different classes of queries.  
(A) The distribution of results for the Country-Issue class of queries. (B) The distribution of 
results for the Organization-Country class of queries. (C) The distribution of results for the 
Organization-Issue class of queries. (D) The distribution of results for the Organization- 
Organization class of queries.
dataset and compare it with the number of times it would be expected to appear 
as a result of pure chance. We do this by taking the ratio between the observed 
and the randomly expected value, a measure called revealed comparative advan-
tage R (Balassa 1965) in international trade, relative risk in statistics (Sistrom and 
Garvan 2004) or lift in computer science (Geng and Hamilton 2006). Consider Na,b 
as the number of hits where organization a and country b appear together, Na as 
the total number of hits in which organization a appears, Nb as the total number 
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of hits in which country b appears and N as the total number of hits in the Organ-
ization-Country queries. We define the relevance of a link between a and b Ra,b as:
,
, .
ab
a
ab
b
N
N
R N
N
=
Ra,b=1 implies that the number of hits obtained is exactly what would be 
expected by pure chance. Note that Ra,b controls for the number of total hits 
received by a and b and hence does not depend on the frequency with which 
different nodes appear in the data. Ra,b>1 indicates that the link is unusually fre-
quent and R<1 that it is infrequent.
4  Results
4.1  Country Space
The Country Space is the network of country co-appearances in the websites of the 
153 aid organizations. Figure 3 visualizes the network for R>1.1 rather than 1.0, to 
capture the links that are more significant while also making the visualization less 
dense and more meaningful (only 10% of links are above 1.1). Here, the size of a node 
is proportional to the number of times the country is cited and its color reflects the 
region of the world the country belongs to. The color of the link is proportional to its 
relevance R, with green representing a stronger link and red a weaker link.
First, we observe that the space is connected, meaning that there are paths 
linking any two countries, despite the fact that we are only visualizing the strong-
est 10% of all links. This means that the aid community has not been split into 
unrelated clusters of countries but maintains some overall unity. Second, we 
observe a strong geographic effect: countries are much more likely to be con-
nected with other countries in their same geographic region. This is particularly 
true in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Middle East and North 
Africa and Latin America. Yet, the network also has a cluster of large countries, 
such as China, Brazil, India and Mexico, that concentrate a substantial number of 
citations and that belong to very different regions of the world.
The structure of Figure 3 is suggestive of economies of scale. Large coun-
tries can be served by many organizations, independent of their relative location 
because their size may justify it. Smaller countries tend to be served through geo-
graphically based clusters.
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4.2  Issue Space
Next, we show the issue space representing all 34 concerns and activities   
(Figure 4) connected according to the frequency with which organizations 
mention both in the same document. Here we find that when we include links 
with RI,0>1 the space is not fully connected. Manufacturing, transportation, elec-
tricity and tourism are disconnected from the rest of the space, indicating that 
they do not tend to appear systematically together in documents discussing 
other issues related to economic and human development. This may reflect the 
fact that development thinking has tended to avoid industry-specific issues in 
growth strategies. Human rights, corruption and democracy form a cycle that 
Node size:
Link strength:
1.1 1.25 >1.4
World Regions
Central America
South America
South Europe
North Europe
East Europe
West Asia
East Asia
South-Central Asia
South-East Asia
Melanesia
South Africa
Central Africa
East Africa
West Africa
North Africa
Caribbean
10 Million 100 Million 1 Billion
Figure 3 The Country Space, i.e., the uni-partite country network as a result of the co- 
appearances of each couple of countries, normalized using R. Each node is a country, 
 connected  if  R was high. The color of the node is the world region where the country is located. 
The color of the edge is proportional to the R value (green=high, orange=medium, red=low). 
The size of the node is the amount of documents retrieved referring to the country.
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Node size:
Link strength:
1 1.57 >2.15
10 Million 100 Million 1 Billion
Node type:
Concern
Activity
Figure 4 The Issue Space, i.e., the uni-partite Issue networks as a result of the co- 
appearances of each couple of issues, normalized using the R. The nodes are the issues 
connected by their R. The color of the edge is proportional to the R value (green=high, 
orange=medium, red=low). Node size is proportional to the popularity of the issue in the 
set of results considered. Node color is used to distinguish concerns (purple) from activities 
(blue).
is weakly connected to the rest of the space. Refugees are linked to civil war, 
natural disasters and humanitarian assistance. Overall, the network illustrates a 
sensible picture of how the international community has organized itself around 
issues.
4.3  Organization Space
Figure 5 shows the Organization Space. Since in this case the number of possible 
links is too large for practical visualization, we start by linking nodes through 
a maximum spanning tree, using Kruskal’s algorithm (Kruskal 1956). The algo-
rithm starts by connecting the two most related organizations. Then it looks for 
the third organization that is more strongly related to either and connects it to the 
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Betweenness Centrality:
Issue Entropy: <4 >5
0.5 0.05 0.005
Figure 5 The Organization Space, i.e., the Organization-Organization co-occurrence 
network as a result of the Organization-Organization class of queries. The nodes are the 
aid   organizations. The edges connect two aid organizations. The thickness of the edge is 
  proportional to the number of documents in which the two organizations co-appear. The 
size of the node is proportional to its betweenness centrality. The color of the node is the 
issue entropy of the organization: red nodes are more entropic (i.e., the organization is 
less   specialized), blue nodes are less entropic.
most related. It continues on, looking for the nth organization that is most related 
to any of the n-1 organizations already linked. It does so until it has linked each 
organization to the nearest neighbor it could find, preserving the condition that 
the resulting structure is a tree, meaning that there are no cycles. The resulting 
graph is called a tree because it connects all the organizations with the minimum 
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number of possible links. We note that two of the 153 organizations, namely the 
Polish and the Romanian Development Agencies are not present in the network, 
as they are never cited together with other organizations. After constructing the 
maximum spanning tree, we add the strongest links so as to bring the average 
degree of the network to nearly 8. This provides 453 additional links and helps 
illustrate the communities that exist in this network. This is the same visualiza-
tion technique used to map the Product Space (Hidalgo et al. 2007) and has also 
been used to visualize connections in the brain (Hagmann et al. 2008).
Here, we color organizations based on how specialized they are on certain 
issues. To do this we use Shannon’s Entropy measure (Shannon 1948):
2
1
( ) ( , )log ( ( , )),
n
i
H o poi poi =−∑
=
where o is an organization, i is an issue and p(o,i) is the relative frequency of issue 
i for organization o, or ro,i/ro. H should capture the fact that Human Rights Watch 
is more specialized than the World Bank. A high value of H indicates a high level 
of entropy, and therefore means that the organization deals with a more diverse 
set of issues. In fact 2H is equal to the effective number of issues that an organiza-
tion is associated with (Jost 2006).
In Figure 5, nodes are sized according to their betweenness centrality. This is 
a network concept that measures the proportion of shortest paths between any 
two nodes that pass through a given node (Newman 2003, 2010). We interpret 
high betweenness centrality nodes -large nodes in our visualization – as impor-
tant connectors, since these are organizations that lie in the shortest path linking 
many other organizations.
Figure 5 shows the effects of the broad distribution shown in Figure 2D. The 
space is held together by large hubs that show high betweenness centrality and 
high entropy. Networks with broad degree distributions can grow with very small 
increases in the average distance between the members of the network. This 
allows having an international community with a large number of organizations 
in which any two organizations are never too far apart. Interestingly the World 
Bank is the organization with the highest entropy and the most central of the 
nodes in the space. The second most central organization is Save the Children, 
which is also characterized by high entropy and centrality but connects preferen-
tially to private donor organizations. The network exhibits a core-periphery struc-
ture where some large organizations, such as the World Bank, Save the Children, 
UNDP and The Ford Foundation, act as hubs and help keep the network together. 
We believe that it is no coincidence that the hubs have high issue entropy, since 
their lack of specialization is required to play a central role in the network.
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We believe that this result is significant because a common discussion among 
development stakeholders is the degree to which organizations should specialize. 
Easterly (2007), for example, argues in favor of aid organizations specializing by 
country or issue in order to increase efficiency. Others have argued that a client-
focused aid organization such as the World Bank, or the major regional develop-
ment banks, should be able to work on the different issues that their heterogene-
ous developing-country partners face, and hence, must be able to deliver a more 
diverse suite of services. Our results suggest that, beyond this discussion, there is 
a systemic role played by the large, diverse organizations: they allow the network 
to remain connected so that the rising number of smaller, specialized entities can 
be linked to the rest by cooperating with the large, entropic organizations. Hence, 
the lack of specialization of the latter plays a systemic role. This implies that the 
degree of specialization of development agencies should be discussed taking into 
account the systemic role they play in the organization space.
4.4  Bipartite Networks
We now move to discuss three bipartite networks. As mentioned earlier, a bi-par-
tite network has two kinds of nodes and the links in the network only connect 
nodes of different kinds. Our three bi-partite networks are the Country-Issue, 
Organization-Issue and Country-Organization networks. Next, we compare the 
structure of each bipartite network to explore the ability of the system to achieve 
consistency in the coordination of which organizations operate in which coun-
tries and on which issues.
Tables 4, 5 and 6 show some of the most and least connected pairs for each 
of the three bipartite networks. It illustrates that the method does find reason-
able connections. For example, for Organization-Issue queries we see a strong 
relation between “Accion International” and “Microenterprise” or “Dubai Cares” 
and “primary school,” which we expect, given the mandate of those institutions. 
At the same time, we see a weak connection between “Joint United Nations Pro-
gramme on HIV/AIDS” and “Banking system,” or between “Doctors Without 
Borders” and “Tourism.” The same considerations can be done for the Country-
Issue queries, where we find a strong association between “Mexico” and “crimi-
nal justice,” and “Malawi” and “HIV,” and weak connections between “Afghani-
stan” and “Small and Medium Enterprises.” Finally, we find a strong association 
between Country-Organization queries such as “Instituto Portugues de Apoio ao 
Desenvolvimento” and “Angola” and “North American Development Bank” and 
“Mexico,” and a weak link between the “Aga Khan Development Network” and 
“Uruguay.”
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Table 6 Some examples of high and low R couplings of issues and organizations.
Organization Issue Results R
Accion International Microenterprise 2750 124.94252
Dubai Cares Primary School 3980 46.32938
Kauffman Foundation Job Creation 9920 16.35688
… … … …
Amnesty International Microenterprise 65 0.01047
Joint United Nations 
Programme on HIV/AIDS
Banking System 32 0.00410
Doctors Without Borders Tourism 17 0.00067
Table 4 Some examples of high and low R couplings of countries and issues.
Country Issue Results R
Mexico Criminal Justice 7,160,000 5.10753
Malawi HIV/AIDS 820,000 4.74479
Ecuador Microenterprise 8450 4.60329
… … … …
Syria School Completion 656 0.24633
Afghanistan SME 2630 0.22421
Iran Microenterprise 2320 0.18767
Table 5 Some examples of high and low R couplings of countries and organizations.
Organization Country Results R
Instituto Portugues de Apoio ao  
Desenvolvimento
Angola 2530 62.74844
Arab Bank for Economic Development 
in Africa
Togo 8530 55.40399
North American Development Bank Mexico 5320 22.91313
… … … …
Aga Khan Development Network Uruguay 39 0.01914
MacArthur Foundation Bosnia and Herzegovina 141 0.01385
Google Org Kazakhstan 5 0.00340
To study the tripartite network of organizations, countries and issues we 
propose to infer its properties by studying the relationship between the three pos-
sible bi-partite networks, as shown in Figure 6. Consider first the relationship 
between a country (e.g., Bolivia) and an issue (e.g., Microenterprise), which is 
captured as the bottom line of the triangle in Figure 6 and is measured by the 
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associated relevance RC,I (equal to 4.05 in our example, as we shall see). This is the 
direct relationship measured by the number of documents that mention simulta-
neously Bolivia and Microenterprise in the World-Wide Web. Consider now the 
opposite vertex, meaning the top corner of the triangle. This vertex is about the 
relationship between the Organization-Issue and the Organization-Country net-
works. It shows how much the organizations that are interested in the country 
(e.g., Bolivia) are also interested in the issue (e.g., Microenterprise), as meas-
ured through the websites of the 153 development agencies. It is an indirect link 
between the country and the issue, created by looking at how the organizations 
relate to both.
This link is represented by a scattergram where the observations are organi-
zations: the x-axis captures the degree to which each organization is related to 
Bolivia and the y-axis measures the degree to which each organization is related 
to microenterprise. The relationship is summarized by the slope of the scatter-
gram, which we call alignment and label as αC,I. In this example, αC,I refers to the 
degree with which organizations that find Bolivia relevant are also interested in 
microenterprise.
Figure 7A–I shows the scattergrams suggested by Figure 6 for some selected 
cases. Figure 7A shows that organizations that are strongly (weakly) associated 
with Bolivia are also strongly (weakly) associated with the Microenterprise issue. 
For instance, the International Cooperation and Development Fund is strongly 
associated with both Bolivia and Microenterprise, whereas the Case Foundation 
is weakly associated with both Bolivia and Microenterprise. In this case we say 
Figure 6 A representation of our tripartite structure. We do not observe directly the tripar-
tite structure, but each of the bipartite parts (Organization-Country, Organization-Issue and 
Country-Issue). To have an idea about how the tripartite structure organizes itself, for each 
direct bipartite observation (say the Country-Issue: RC,I) we create an indirect observation via 
the other two edges, represented by a scattergram in the opposite vertex, that returns an αC,I 
for the Country-Issue as the exponent of its power regression. This procedure is general for any 
tripartite structure observed only through its bipartite components.
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Figure 7 Scatterplots of the three bi-partite networks, showing the relationship between the 
two complementary measures of relevance R for the Country-Issue, Organization-Issue and 
Organization-Country class of queries. The direct measure of relevance appears in the sub-title 
of the graph. The first row shows examples of combinations with high relevance Rs and posi-
tive alignment α; in the second row shows examples of low Rs and negative α; the third row 
shows examples of high but no significant alignment α.
there is alignment because there is a positive association between the relevance 
of Bolivia and Microenterprise and this is captured by a high αC,I. The value of RC,I 
is shown at the top of each graph in Figure 7.
Figure 7A–I shows 9 scattergrams arranged in three columns. The first column 
shows examples from the Country-Issue bi-partite network, the second column 
from the Organization-Issue network and the third from the Country-Organiza-
tion network. Figure 7B shows an example of a negative association: in this case 
between Ivory Coast and climate change. The relevance of the direct relationship 
is low with an RC,I=0.34. We note that organizations associated with Ivory Coast are 
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not associated with climate change, and vice versa. By contrast, the bottom graph 
of this first column (Figure 7C) shows what looks like an   incongruity between 
Colombia and hospital. Colombia is strongly connected to “hospital” (RC,I=1.34), 
but the organizations that are linked to Colombia are not those that focus on 
health. We call this a mismatch.
The middle column in Figure 7 (D–F) studies the links between organizations 
and issues, and the right column, the links between organizations and countries. 
In both cases we show one example with a positive association (Figure 7D and G), a 
negative association (Figure 7E and H) and a mismatch (Figure 7F and I). Given our 
tri-partite network, there are 25,772 possible scattergrams that can be constructed 
with our dataset and are available in the Aid Explorer, our web application.
4.5  An Intermediate View of the System
We can now look at a higher level of aggregation. We can look more systematically 
at the relationship between the relevance Ri,j and the alignment αi,j for i, j=(Issue, 
Country, Organization) and j≠i to assess a higher order degree of consistency of 
the aid coordination process. When RC,I and αC,I are both high it means that the 
country is strongly related to the issue [as shown by the high  ( ,) R CI ↓ ] but also 
that it is related preferentially to organizations that also focus significantly on 
the issue. We say that there is a positive match between relevance as captured 
by RC,I and the alignment as captured by αC,I. We call this relationship the issue-
consistency of the country.
Figure 8A represents the issue-consistency of Bolivia as it illustrates the relation-
ship between relevance RC,I and alignment αC,I for all issues and not just for microen-
terprise. Here, the y-axis is the relevance of the issue to Bolivia, measured by search-
ing the whole World Wide Web. The x-axis measures the alignment αC,I between 
Bolivia and each issue through the consistency with which the organizations that 
are linked to Bolivia also find the issue salient, measured through the websites of 
aid organizations. For example, Figure 7A showed that the organizations associated 
with Bolivia are also associated with Microenterprise. Hence, in Figure 8A, micro-
enterprise appears as a single point in the upper-right quadrant (high RC,I and αC,I).   
Conversely, Bolivia is not strongly associated with “Refugee” (RC,I<1) and in this case 
the alignment of organizations associated with both Refugees and Bolivia is poor, 
with a negative αC,I. Overall, the Bolivia Issue Plot (Figure 8A) shows a high issue 
consistency of Bolivia, given that issues that are strongly associated with Bolivia 
(high RC,I) are also the issues where there is a positive alignment.
Figure 8A uses the relationship between the bottom of the triangle in Figure 
6 and the top vertex. But we could also create a similar relationship using the left 
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Figure 8 Consistency graphs: the scattergrams show relevance vs. alignment scatterplots for 
the three bi-partite plots and two consistency criteria. Given a country we plot the relationship 
between its issue relevance and the alignment α of organizations with both the country and the 
issues. We repeat the same procedure also for organizations and issues using each of the two 
related concepts of alignment.
side of the triangle and the right-side vertex. This means that we would relate the 
relevance of the Organization-Country link RO,C to the alignment between organi-
zation and country aO,C, for a particular country, say Bolivia. This is shown in 
Figure 8B. Here the points on the scattergram are organizations rather than issues 
and it tells us which are the organizations that are salient to Bolivia and aligned 
with its issues. We refer to the relationship in Figure 8A as a country’s issue con-
sistency, while that of Figure 8B as a country’s organizational consistency.
Figure 8C illustrates the issue consistency of organizations, using the IMF as 
an example. It is based on relating the right side with the left vertex of Figure 6. It 
shows which are the issues that are relevant to the IMF and that are aligned with 
it in terms of being important for the countries that the IMF cites more frequently. 
Figure 8D shows the country consistency of the IMF. It describes what are the 
countries that are relevant for the IMF and how aligned are the issues in those 
countries with those that the IMF focuses on. It is based on the left side and the 
right vertex of Figure 6.
Figure 8E looks at human rights as an example of the country consistency 
of issues. It is based on relating the bottom side to the top vertex of Figure 6. It 
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shows that Human Rights is a relevant issue in Syria and that the organizations 
that care about human rights also care about Syria, but it is a less salient issue in 
Argentina and so the organizations that care about human rights are less salient 
there. Figure 8F shows the organization consistency of issues. It is based on relat-
ing the right side to the left vertex of Figure 6. It shows that human rights are a 
salient issue for Human Rights Watch and that the organization focuses on coun-
tries where the human rights issue is salient. The opposite is true about the World 
Bank. By contrast, the Skoll Foundation finds the human rights issue relevant, 
but it does not align well with countries where the issue is salient and hence 
shows a negative alignment.
These sets of graphs can allow us to understand the aspects that make a 
country, an organization or an issue be more or less consistent. Given that there 
are three nodes and two types of consistency, we can generate 2×110=220 country 
graphs, 2×153=306 organization graphs and 2×34=68 issue graphs, for a total of 
594 graphs. This is a more aggregated view of the system than the 25,772 graphs 
of the kind shown in Figure 7, and can permit an analysis at a more systemic level, 
but it still is a very high dimensional description.
4.6  An Aggregate View of the Aid Coordination Network
To develop a more systemic view of the consistency of the aid coordination network 
we can re-aggregate the data to a higher level. Here, we look for a measure that 
tells us to what extent countries are being engaged by the right organizations, 
given the issues that are salient to them. Or alternatively, which organizations are 
engaged with the right countries, given the issues that they have decided to focus 
on. Or which are the issues that have an appropriate deployment of organizations 
in countries.
To make this judgment we propose to develop three overall consistency 
indexes, one for each node type in the tri-partite network. The index would be the 
proportion of the relevant links Ri,j>1 that also have a consistency αi,j>ξ where ξ is 
some cutoff value.6 To make the indexes meaningful and comparable, we normal-
ize them by the maximum number that the ratio could achieve on average for all 
6 An alternative would be to consider a weighted measure, such as a correlation, rather than 
one based on cutoffs and counts. We did not take this route because we care about the quality of 
positive matches rather than the intensity of the negative matches. A regression approach treats 
both as symmetric. Secondly, correlation-based measures give higher weights to both positive 
and negative outliers and given the noise in the data, make the results less precise. This issue 
could be revisited if data based on triplets rather than pairs were used, as discussed in the con-
cluding section.
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the observations in the set if consistency was perfect. More precisely we propose 
to measure the following overall consistency indexes:
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where the letter S refers to the set to which the elements belong, i=countries, 
organizations or issues. The index i refers to the specific country, issue or organ-
ization that is being considered and the j’s depend on the type of consistency 
that is considered. For the case of organizations, we use the country-consist-
ency, as this will tell us, given the part of the world that the organization has 
chosen to focus on, whether it is in tune with the issues that are salient in those 
countries. We measure the degree to which the countries that the organization 
cares about, meaning that RO,C>1, are countries where the issues the organi-
zation cares about are also salient in the country, and hence have significant 
alignment αO,C>ξ.
For the case of countries we use their issue consistency, since we care that the 
issues that a country confronts be adequately tended to, independently of which 
organization does it. For issues we use the organization consistency, given that 
we want to assess the degree to which organizations are adequately deployed to 
deal with the issue that countries find salient.
In general, the number of total observations with αi,j>ξ will depend on the 
choice of ξ. To make our measure less dependent on this choice, we normalize 
the numerator dividing it by the ratio between the total number observations with 
αi,j>ξ and the number of observations with Ri,j>1. This latter ratio is the highest 
possible value that perfect consistency would achieve, on average. This normali-
zation factor makes a ratio of 1 for the whole class to imply perfect consistency.
To decide on the cutoffs, we note that out of 3740 observations in our   
Country-Issue network, 1768 have RC,I>1 (47.3%) and 916 have a αC,I>0.2. This 
means that if the system were perfectly coordinated we would get a ratio of 51.8% 
of the observations with RC,I>1 that also have αC,I>0.2. (see Table 7). So, by dividing 
by this ratio, we measure consistency relative to this maximum. This approach 
corrects for the arbitrariness of the cutoff and for noise in our data. We use the 
same cutoff of 0.2 for the organization-issue network and a cutoff of 0.5 for the 
Country-Organization network. The relevant numbers are shown in Table 7.
This measure allows us to get a sense of the degree to which each country, 
each organization and each issue is adequately coordinated. Tables 8, 9 and 10 
show rankings based on our overall consistency measure.
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Table 8 shows the ranking of aid organizations according to our overall con-
sistency index. Note that this measure considers the countries that the organi-
zation finds salient, so it should not penalize regionally focused institutions. It 
then asks whether the organization engages countries in issues that are salient 
to them. The top of the list is dominated by bilateral development agencies such 
as those of China, Norway, Portugal and Austria. However, this is not a general 
Table 7 Summary statistics on salience and consistency.
(a) (b) (c)=(b)/(a) (d) (e) (f)=(e)/(b)
Bipartite Networks N N (R>1) Ratio Cutoff N (a>cutoff) N (a)/N (R)
Country, Issue 3740 1768 47.3% 0.2 916 51.8%
Organization, Issue 5202 1889 36.3% 0.2 914 48.4%
Organization, Country 16,830 6890 40.9% 0.5 5206 75.6%
Table 8 The organization ranking. For each organization we report the degree to which the 
countries that are relevant for the organization also exhibit high issue alignment. The number 
reflects the percentage consistency relative to the theoretical maximum for the average of the 
whole table (see in the text and Table 7).
Rank Organization Country consistency
1 China Development Industrial Bank 132.35%
2 Childreach 132.35%
3 Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation 127.25%
4 Andean Development Corporation 117.64%
5 Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa 117.22%
6 Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere 117.00%
7 Fast Track Initiative Catalytic Fund 116.06%
8 Instituto Portugues de Apoio ao Desenvolvimento 115.80%
9 Austrian Development Agency 115.27%
10 International Cooperation and Development Fund 111.45%
11 Austria Wirtschaftsservice Gesellschaft 109.24%
12 West African Development Bank 108.99%
13 New Zealand Agency for International Development 108.86%
14 German Development Bank 108.86%
15 Korea International Cooperation Agency 108.28%
16 African Capacity Building Foundation 107.53%
17 United Nations Capital Development Fund 106.22%
18 UK Department for International Development 105.88%
19 Belgian Technical Cooperation 105.20%
20 EuropeAid Development and Cooperation 103.99%
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Rank Organization Country consistency
21 OPEC Fund for International Development 103.80%
22 Nordic Development Fund 103.73%
23 US African Development Foundation 102.94%
24 Spanish Agency for International Cooperation 102.74%
25 Japan Bank for International Cooperation 101.80%
26 Adventist development and relief agency 100.26%
27 Christian Reformed World Relief Committee 99.77%
28 United States Agency for International Development 99.67%
29 Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency 99.26%
30 Congo Basin Forest Fund 98.70%
31 Japan Official Development Assistance 95.58%
32 Mercy Corps International 95.06%
33 Accion International 93.92%
34 United Way International 93.66%
35 Canadian International Development Agency 91.62%
36 Global Alliance for Vaccines & Immunization 90.99%
37 Agencia Brasileira de Cooperacao 90.55%
38 Development Alternatives Inc. 90.38%
39 International Fund for Agricultural Development 89.29%
40 Medical Assistance Program International 88.23%
41 Italian Development Cooperation Programme 86.63%
42 Hellenic Aid 84.90%
43 Grameen Foundation 84.84%
44 Israel’s Agency for International Development Cooperation 84.22%
45 American Refugee Committee 83.33%
46 Asian Development Bank 80.88%
47 United Nations Development Programme 79.41%
48 Case Foundation 79.41%
49 Inter-American Foundation 78.20%
50 Acumen Fund 76.85%
51 Islamic Relief Worldwide 76.62%
52 Lux-Development 76.10%
53 Food For The Hungry 75.00%
54 United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees 74.24%
55 French Development Agency 73.53%
56 AmeriCares Disaster Relief and Humanitarian Aid Organization 73.53%
57 Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation 72.70%
58 Slovak Aid 71.84%
59 Aga Khan Development Network 70.58%
60 Global Fund to Fight Aids, Tuberculosis and Malaria 68.01%
61 Japan International Cooperation Agency 67.58%
62 World Concern 66.17%
63 Novartis Foundation 66.17%
64 World Vision International 65.29%
(Table 8 Continued)
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Rank Organization Country consistency
65 Global Environment Facility 64.63%
66 Life for Relief and Development 63.89%
67 American Red Cross 63.89%
68 Danish International Development Agency 62.04%
69 Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency 61.64%
70 Church World Service 61.33%
71 United Nations Centre for Human Settlements 61.23%
72 Irish Aid 60.56%
73 World Food Programme 59.39%
74 United Nations Development Fund for Women 58.82%
75 Medair 58.82%
76 American Jewish World Service 58.39%
77 Australian Agency for International Development 55.50%
78 Shell Foundation 54.50%
79 Schwab Foundation 54.50%
80 Lemelson Foundation 53.92%
81 Caribbean Development Bank 53.77%
82 Atlantic Philanthropies 52.94%
83 North American Development Bank 50.90%
84 Netherlands Ministry of Development Cooperation 50.60%
85 European Investment Bank 49.94%
86 Lutheran World Relief 49.16%
87 Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS 48.76%
88 African Development Bank 48.53%
89 IBM International Foundation 47.27%
90 Dubai Cares 46.32%
91 Rockefeller Brothers Fund 46.03%
92 Carlos Slim Foundation 44.12%
93 Refugees International 43.53%
94 Helvetas 41.79%
95 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 41.72%
96 World Relief 41.66%
97 Arab Fund for Economic & Social Development 39.70%
98 Amnesty International 39.70%
99 International Committee of the Red Cross 39.21%
100 Food and Agriculture Organization 39.16%
101 Catholic Overseas Development Agency 38.50%
102 High Commissioner of Human Rights 38.47%
103 Seven fund 37.81%
104 Direct Relief International 37.81%
105 Oxfam International 37.53%
106 American Friends Service Committee 37.22%
107 China Development Bank 36.76%
108 United Nations Environment Programme 36.61%
(Table 8 Continued)
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Rank Organization Country consistency
109 International Development Research Centre 34.83%
110 Eurasia Foundation 34.83%
111 Human Rights Watch 34.66%
112 Millennium Challenge Corporation 34.61%
113 United Nations Office for Project Services 34.41%
114 Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation 33.61%
115 Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Internationale Zusammenarbeit 32.28%
116 Concern Worldwide 30.08%
117 Inter-American Development Bank 29.88%
118 Skoll Foundation 29.41%
119 Mo Ibrahim Foundation 29.05%
120 Human Rights Council 28.95%
121 Grameen Bank 28.77%
122 Waleed bin Talal Foundation 22.06%
123 Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency 21.61%
124 Action Against Hunger 21.61%
125 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 21.10%
126 Soros Foundation 20.05%
127 European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 20.05%
128 Agence d’Aide a la Cooperation Technique Et au Developpement 17.08%
129 MacArthur Foundation 16.54%
130 Google Org 16.54%
131 Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development 16.54%
132 Doctors Without Borders 16.29%
133 Abu Dhabi Fund for Development 13.57%
134 World Health Organization 13.23%
135 United Nations Democracy Fund 12.22%
136 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 12.17%
137 International Monetary Fund 11.51%
138 Finnish Department for International Development Co-operation 11.03%
139 Christian Aid 10.18%
140 Save the Children 9.57%
141 Salvation Army International Headquarters 9.45%
142 Maktoum Foundation 8.82%
143 Ashoka 5.29%
144 Liechtensteinische Entwicklungsdienst 5.09%
145 Kauffman foundation 4.01%
146 Hewlett Foundation 2.94%
147 Rockefeller Foundation 2.45%
148 Ford Foundation 1.59%
149 World Bank 0.00%
150 Islamic Development Bank 0.00%
151 Belgian Policy Plan for Development Cooperation 0.00%
(Table 8 Continued)
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Table 9 The country ranking. For each country we report the degree to which the issues that 
are relevant for the country also exhibit high organizational alignment. The number reflects the 
percentage consistency relative to the theoretical maximum for the average of the whole table 
(see in the text and Table 7).
Rank Country Issue consistency
1 El Salvador 124.89%
2 Iraq 122.83%
3 Mauritius 120.63%
4 Chile 115.81%
5 Iran 107.23%
6 Liberia 105.28%
7 Syria 96.51%
8 Panama 96.51%
9 Pakistan 96.51%
10 Afghanistan 96.51%
11 Gambia 91.43%
12 Benin 91.43%
13 Bosnia and Herzegovina 90.07%
14 Serbia 87.73%
15 Albania 87.73%
16 Cameroon 86.86%
17 Tunisia 85.78%
18 Macedonia 85.78%
19 Jamaica 85.78%
20 Ecuador 85.78%
21 Mauritania 84.44%
22 Sri Lanka 82.72%
23 Niger 82.72%
24 Sierra Leone 81.27%
25 Mexico 80.42%
26 Argentina 80.42%
27 Papua New Guinea 79.48%
28 Myanmar 78.96%
29 Lebanon 77.21%
30 Jordan 77.21%
31 Honduras 77.21%
32 Botswana 77.21%
33 Ghana 75.06%
34 Guinea-Bissau 74.24%
35 Costa Rica 74.24%
36 Zambia 73.53%
37 Nicaragua 73.53%
38 Yemen 72.38%
39 Romania 72.38%
40 Uruguay 71.11%
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Rank Country Issue consistency
41 Paraguay 71.11%
42 Armenia 71.11%
43 Dominican Republic 70.19%
44 Ukraine 68.93%
45 Ivory Coast 68.93%
46 Kazakhstan 68.12%
47 Gabon 68.12%
48 Chad 68.12%
49 Azerbaijan 68.12%
50 Republic of Congo 67.13%
51 Peru 64.34%
52 Namibia 64.34%
53 Mozambique 64.34%
54 Morocco 64.34%
55 Mali 64.34%
56 Lao People Democratic Republic 64.34%
57 Haiti 64.34%
58 Colombia 64.34%
59 Burkina Faso 64.34%
60 Algeria 64.34%
61 Senegal 61.41%
62 Togo 60.95%
63 Tajikistan 60.32%
64 Malawi 58.74%
65 Latvia 57.90%
66 Cambodia 57.90%
67 Bulgaria 57.90%
68 Madagascar 56.77%
69 Central African Republic 56.77%
70 Guinea 56.30%
71 Libya 55.15%
72 Ethiopia 55.15%
73 China 55.15%
74 Brazil 55.15%
75 Democratic Republic of Congo 54.04%
76 Guatemala 53.61%
77 Nepal 50.79%
78 Zimbabwe 48.25%
79 Swaziland 48.25%
80 Philippines 48.25%
81 Eritrea 48.25%
82 Timor-Leste 46.32%
83 Nigeria 45.41%
84 India 45.41%
(Table 9 Continued)
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Rank Country Issue consistency
85 Angola 45.41%
86 Moldova 44.54%
87 Bangladesh 43.87%
88 Venezuela 42.89%
89 Uganda 42.89%
90 Sudan 42.89%
91 Lesotho 40.63%
92 Bolivia 40.63%
93 Kosovo 35.09%
94 Burundi 35.09%
95 Turkmenistan 29.69%
96 South Africa 28.95%
97 Rwanda 28.95%
98 Malaysia 27.57%
99 Kenya 27.57%
100 Egypt 27.57%
101 Uzbekistan 24.13%
102 Kyrgyzstan 24.13%
103 Belarus 24.13%
104 Tanzania 19.30%
105 Georgia 17.55%
106 Indonesia 14.85%
107 Vietnam 12.87%
108 Turkey 0.00%
109 Thailand 0.00%
110 Mongolia 0.00%
(Table 9 Continued)
feature of bilateral agencies as those of Belgium, Finland and Abu Dhabi are at 
the bottom of the list. At the top of the list we do find some multilateral develop-
ment agencies such as the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa and 
the Andean Development Corporation, although the Islamic Development Bank 
is at the bottom of the list. But the large central hubs such as the World Bank, the 
IMF and Save the Children are at the bottom of the list. This may be due to their 
high entropy, as they deal with many countries and issues, given the systemic role 
we have argued they perform.
We find many private foundations at the bottom of the list, such as the Ford, 
Rockefeller, Hewlett, Kauffman, and Google Foundations. This may be due to the 
fact that these organizations are not necessarily focused on typical development 
issues. Some as in the case of the Soros Foundation, tend to take a contrarian 
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Table 10 The issue ranking. For each organization we report the degree to which the issues 
that are relevant for countries also exhibit high organizational alignment. The number reflects 
the percentage consistency relative to the theoretical maximum for the average of the whole 
table (see in the text and Table 7).
Rank Issue Organization Consistency
1 Malnutrition 129.16%
2 School completion 127.75%
3 Poverty reduction 127.39%
4 Humanitarian assistance 125.47%
5 HIV/AIDS 125.01%
6 Environmental sustainability 118.09%
7 Infant mortality 114.40%
8 Microenterprise 112.39%
9 Homicides 103.33%
10 Small and medium enterprise 101.69%
11 Refugee 99.50%
12 Sanitation 99.19%
13 Natural disaster 93.58%
14 Rural development 85.51%
15 Criminal justice 79.01%
16 Primary school 55.76%
17 Technological development 46.50%
18 Gender 40.82%
19 Human rights 39.74%
20 Civil war 39.74%
21 Electricity 36.74%
22 Agriculture 36.04%
23 Transportation 35.18%
24 Democracy 24.31%
25 Economic growth 16.31%
26 Hospital 15.12%
27 Manufacturing 13.78%
28 Climate change 11.81%
29 Tourism 8.98%
30 Corruption 8.61%
31 Reconstruction 7.75%
32 Housing 7.65%
33 Job creation 3.50%
34 Banking system 0.00%
view. Nevertheless, Childreach is at the top of the list. According to our rankings, 
the average level of consistency is 59.2% of the theoretical maximum described 
above.
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Table 9 shows the ranking of countries. Here we used the issue consistency 
meaning that we look at the issues that are salient in the country and ask whether 
the organizations that are involved with the country also find those issues salient. 
There is a very broad distribution of values between countries of different sizes, 
regions and levels of development at both ends of the list. In this case, the average 
level of consistency is 62.1% of the theoretical maximum.
Table 10 shows the ranking of issues. Here we use the organizational consist-
ency, meaning that we look at the organizations that find the issues salient and 
ask whether they are involved in the countries that are also strongly linked to 
those issues. Here the issues that have to do with poverty such as malnutrition, 
poverty reduction, humanitarian assistance and infant mortality appear high 
on the list, while the issues that deal with economic growth, such as banking 
systems, job creation or manufacturing, are at the bottom. Interestingly, envi-
ronmental sustainability appears to be better coordinated than global warming, 
while human rights, technological development and gender appear in the middle 
of the list. For the issues, we observe an average consistency equal to 61.4% of the 
theoretical maximum.
5  Concluding Remarks
International development is a highly complex global enterprise that must con-
front coordination problems of paramount proportions. Since World War II, the 
proliferation of states, organizations and issues has created a space that is large, 
complex and rapidly evolving. In this paper we have developed a method that 
leverages the vast amount of information available on the web to measure the 
tripartite network connecting countries, organizations, and issues, and use it to 
estimate the degree of coordination that the world has, de facto, been able to 
achieve.
Given a set of countries and an evolving set of issues, coordination requires 
the ability of organizations to adapt either the portfolio of countries that they 
serve, or the issues they work on. Our measures indicate that the international 
aid network has indeed achieved a significant level of de facto coordination, 
as expressed in their online speech. Our methods, however, show that in many 
cases coordination is low, highlighting countries that are poorly served, issues 
that are not well attended, and organizations that appear to be focusing on the 
wrong combination of places and issues. Donors and recipients can use the 
tools and information we developed in this paper and in the Aid Explorer, the 
associated web application, to identify, in a decentralized manner, areas for 
improvement.
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During the 1980s and 1990s, aid coordination was led by the World Bank. 
Since then, the de jure approach to aid coordination has changed and it is now 
based on the Millennium Development Goals (2000), the Paris Declaration for 
Aid Effectiveness (2005) and the Accra Agenda for Action (2008). It implies a 
major effort at decentralizing decision-making by giving a more prominent role 
to recipient national governments. The idea is that these governments should 
develop their own poverty reduction strategy in accordance with the MDGs and 
these strategies should be the basis for a formal coordination process organized 
through consultative groups and roundtables.
This approach has the advantage of increasing the number of coordinators 
(from say one – i.e., The World Bank – to the number of recipient governments), 
thus reducing the amount of coordination that each must achieve, but it still 
leaves quite a complex task. After all, there are hundreds of aid organizations, 
hundreds of recipient state and local governments, dozens of executing agencies 
and dozens of issues that need to be paired.
Under these conditions, self-organizing processes may exhibit some distinct 
advantages. First, they require little ex ante explicit coordination. Second, they 
have the power to reveal information about emerging needs and organizational 
expertise. Third, they can deal with levels of complexity that strict hierarchies 
have trouble coping with. Yet, self-organizing processes also have limitations, 
since they need to satisfy some basic requirements for them to be able to operate 
properly.
First and foremost is information: donors must be able to know what recipi-
ents want and what other donors are willing to supply. Recipients must be able to 
know what donors are willing to provide and what they might be willing to con-
sider. If donors had this information, and if they were focused on maximizing the 
bang of their development bucks, given whatever goals or preferences they have, 
they will naturally move towards the needs that are least attended among those 
that they care about. By the same token, if a recipient country knew about the 
willingness of each donor to support different activities they would adjust their 
priorities and partnerships to achieve maximum effect, given their preferences. 
So information is key for the self-organizing process to be efficient.
Second, a system based on matches between willing donors and willing 
recipients is bound to increase the number of transactions, and if these have very 
large transaction costs, then it might be better to forgo this option in favor of a 
more centralized process that avoids the multiplicity of transactions. The inter-
national development community has de facto understood this problem and the 
Accra Agenda for Action calls for streamlining procurement rules and reporting 
standards in order to reduce the recipient’s transactions costs associated with 
working with multiple partners.
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In this context, a system that highlights the countries that are being poorly 
served, the issues that are inadequately attended and the organizations that 
have an imbalance between their goals and their partners may allow the differ-
ent players of the aid community to improve their effectiveness without the need 
for a central planner. Such a system may allow supply and demand to find each 
other more quickly and for organizations and countries to change strategies more 
dynamically in the face of new information. This paper presents a very crude first 
approach to collect the data, and develop the analytics, that would inform such 
a system.
Our approach does approximate what is required for decentralized coordina-
tion because it facilitates the identification of the issues and countries that organ-
izations care about and the issues that countries care about. Our metrics can be 
used as “prices” that facilitate unrealized matches between willing donors and 
recipients: Organizations and countries will seek to interact with partners that 
share interests, in the same way as in the market the equilibrium involves match-
ing willing sellers with willing buyers. The coordination occurs ex post through 
the matching process rather than ex ante through some assignment of roles and 
tasks, something that is very hard to achieve given the large number of possible 
combinations and the fact that donor agencies are not hierarchically related and 
so need not follow each other’s orders. Our associated website, The Aid Explorer, 
should be useful in identifying potential new matches and hence accelerate the 
decentralized coordination process.
While our approach is an approximation, it could be much improved. For 
example, we have queried only pairs and not triplets or quadruplets. We were 
deterred from this more exhaustive approach by the limitations imposed by 
public APIs and by out of pocket search costs of such an endeavor, given the con-
straints of academic research. But a system that is supposed to guide hundreds 
of billions of dollars of support should find the additional costs of better data 
quite insignificant. Moreover, if the data gathering process was done continu-
ously, time resolution could be improved. In addition the issues that the analysis 
considers may emerge from “word cloud” analysis of the organizations’ websites, 
rather than from a manually curated list. Finally, the number of organizations, 
both on the donor and the recipient sides, could be greatly expanded. While we 
believe that our simplified approach has shown that it has value as a proof-of-
concept, a full implementation of the above agenda would transform it into a 
comprehensive tool for professional and institutional use.
One word of caution that needs to be considered is the possibility that organi-
zations will try to game the rankings provided by a system that is based mostly on 
the collection of online data. In a world where the expression of an organization 
in the web is considered an important indicator of their development expertise, 
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there are clear incentives for an organization to cheat by focusing on “making 
noise” about development assistance instead of actually providing it. Ultimately, 
organizations looking to get ahead of others might try to inundate the web with 
documents that mention the keywords used in the data collection process. While 
this is an important caveat for the future applicability of these methods, it is 
important to note that this caveat does not apply exclusively to the methods pre-
sented in this paper. In fact, the incentive to focus on providing signals, instead of 
performing actions, will always be present in a world where it is hard to attribute 
outcomes to individual actors.
The methodology we developed in this paper can be applied to other con-
texts. The most similar situation is that of private foundations and their recipi-
ents. Much more ambitious would be the analysis of the interactions between 
government agencies and between these and the other social organizations such 
as corporations, unions and other non-governmental entities. Here, governments 
manage ~106 pages of legislations and ~103 executing agencies. They face hun-
dreds of thousands of organizations that are affected by this complex hyper-
space. Under these conditions, there must be many Pareto improvements that 
are impeded by the information problem that this structure faces. Tools that relax 
this information problem by exploiting the web may allow for a more efficient 
decentralized coordination in complex social systems.
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